Operational-level naval planning using agent-based simulation by Ercetin, Askin
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-03
Operational-level naval planning using agent-based simulation.
Ercetin, Askin.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10836
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 




March 2001 • 
Thesis Advisor: Michael Zyda 
Thesis Co-Advisor: John Hiles 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
20010529 036 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2.   REPORT DATE 
March 2001 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Operational-Level Naval Planning Using 
Agent-Based Simulation  
6.   AUTHOR(S) 
Ercetin, Askin 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
This thesis uses agent-based modeling techniques to develop a simulation of the operational-level naval 
planning process. The simulation serves as an initial exploratory laboratory for analyzing the consequences of the force 
allocation, force deployment, and force movement decisions made by operational-level naval commanders during times 
of conflict or crisis. This model will hopefully help decision-makers in gaining insight into the naval planning process 
and enable them to make more informed decisions in the future. 
The agents in the model represent the opponent operational-level naval commanders. These agents perform 
force allocation, force deployment, and force movement tasks based on their perceived environment, attributes, and 
movement personalities. There are seven naval platform types represented in the model by default, but any type of 
naval platform can be added to the simulation. An integrated graphical user interface enables the user to instantiate 
agent and platform attributes, set simulation parameters, and analyze statistical output. 
The resulting model demonstrates the ability of the agent-based modeling to capture many dynamic aspects of 
the operational-level naval planning process. It establishes an initial simulation tool to further explore the operational- 
level naval planning process. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Multi-Agent System, Agent-Based Modeling, Helicopter Reconnaissance, Comanche, Adaptive 
Behavior, Modeling and Simulation 
15.        NUMBER    OF 
PAGES 
122 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY 












20.      LIMITATION   OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL NAVAL PLANNING USING AGENT-BASED 
SIMULATION 
Askin Ercetin 
Lieutenant Junior Grade, Turkish Navy 
B. S., Turkish Naval Academy, 1995 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 





NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2001 
Michael Zyda^Jhesis Advisor 
ohn Hues, Thesis Co-Advisor 
a^W--^ 
Rudy Darken, Academic Associate 
Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation Academic Group 
Michael Zyda, Chair 
Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation Academic Group 
m 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses agent-based modeling techniques to develop a simulation of the 
operational-level naval planning process. The simulation serves as an initial exploratory 
laboratory for analyzing the consequences of the force allocation, force deployment, and 
force movement decisions made by operational-level naval commanders during times of 
conflict or crisis. This model will hopefully help decision-makers in gaining insight into 
the naval planning process and enable them to make more informed decisions in the 
future. 
The agents in the model represent the opponent operational-level naval 
commanders. These agents perform force allocation, force deployment, and force 
movement tasks based on their perceived environment, attributes, and movement 
personalities. There are seven naval platform types represented in the model by default, 
but any type of naval platform can be added to the simulation. An integrated graphical 
user interface enables the user to instantiate agent and platform attributes, set simulation 
parameters, and analyze statistical output. 
The resulting model demonstrates the ability of the agent-based modeling to 
capture many dynamic aspects of the operational-level naval planning process. It 
establishes an initial simulation tool to further explore the operational-level naval 
planning process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
Agent-based simulation techniques can be used to model and simulate naval 
combat in order to assist operational-level decision-makers in understanding the potential 
consequences of their force allocation and force management decisions. 
B. MOTIVATION 
The three basic roles of a Navy of any nation are peacetime engagement, 
deterrence or conflict prevention, and fight and win. In order to accomplish these goals, a 
capable Navy should be fully operational at all times. This requires carefully studied 
plans at every level of procurement, maintenance and operation cycles of naval platforms. 
All of these plans fall under a single name, "Naval planning process." 
The naval planning process consists of three tightly related sub-processes. The 
first sub-process is strategic planning that basically aims at developing top level naval 
war plans and procuring naval platforms that are capable of achieving these plans. Navy's 
top leaders, in coordination with the top military and government leaders, conduct the 
strategic planning process. The second sub-process is operational planning, which 
focuses on delivering the maximum impact from naval force capabilities to achieve 
operational objectives by supporting the combatant commanders. A wide spectrum of 
naval commanders can conduct the operational planning process, depending on the 
organization of the Navy and the nature of the operational plans needed. A person 
responsible for this process is called the operational commander. The last sub-process is 
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tactical planning, which considers the employment and the maneuvers of individual units 
in relation to each other and the enemy. The immediate commanders of the unit 
commanders in the operational area conduct the tactical planning process. A person 
responsible for this process is called the tactical commander. 
Operational planning, described briefly in the previous paragraph, is the key 
process of the naval planning. Generally, the outcome of naval battles not only depends 
on superiority in numbers but also on superiority in operational plans. A carefully studied 
operational plan supported by precise intelligence greatly enhances the effectiveness of 
tactical commanders in the field. Presently, operational commanders are regularly making 
key decisions with neither the time nor the ability to fully model how these decisions 
might effect the outcome of the naval combat. A model of naval operations that captures 
important decision-making aspects of a real battle can assist commanders in gaining 
insight into this operational planning process. This insight would help those commanders 
make more informed decisions in the future. 
Both entertainment and military organizations have used conventional modeling 
and simulation techniques for a long time to reach their objectives in their respective 
applications. However, these techniques have not allowed them to model and simulate 
complex adaptive systems like naval combat. This was true because everything was hard- 
coded in these conventional models at the beginning of the simulation and so exploring 
the causes of dynamic change was impossible. Complex adaptive system techniques 
provide the analyst with an explicit way to control the dynamics of the model, usually by 
adjusting a set of variables. (Casti, 1997). 
Over the past several decades, the entertainment industry has used a new 
modeling and simulation technology called "agent-based simulation" in their computer 
games that in most ways surpassed the technologies used by military training facilities. 
Ill-defined problems and complex adaptive systems like naval combat can be effectively 
modeled by using agent-based simulation techniques (Arthur, 1994). The military has 
used this technology for the last five years. ISAAC (Irreducible Semi-Autonomous 
Adaptive Combat) was one of the first military research studies that modeled land combat 
by using agent-based simulation techniques (Ilachinsky, 1997). Likewise, agent-based 
simulation techniques can also be used to model naval combat in order to provide 
decision-makers insight into the dynamics of naval combat. 
An ill-defined problem can be described as a problem that does not have any of 
the three following properties: a well-defined initial state, a well-defined and small 
number of solutions that can be evaluated easily, and a well-defined goal state. In this 
respect, operational-level naval combat is an ill-defined problem because the initial state 
is not well defined (the actual opponent force level and their plans are not known) and 
there are several interactions within and between opponent forces that cannot be 
evaluated easily. Even the goals of the opponents may be unclear to each other. 
C.       THESIS GOALS 
The overall goals of this thesis are: 
• Develop an Operational Planning Laboratory, a model that demonstrates the 
successful implementation of a non-situated, and low-resolution operational- 
level naval combat through agent-based simulation techniques. 
• Prove usefulness of the model through the output and analyses of summary 
statistics gathered from experimental simulation scenarios. 
D.       THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Six chapters that comprise this research: 
• Chapter I - Introduction: Identifies the purpose and motivation behind 
conducting this research. Establishes the goals for the thesis. 
• Chapter II - Agent-Based Modeling: Provides information on agent-based 
modeling and simulation. 
• Chapter III - Operational-Level Naval Planning: Introduces basic concepts 
for the operational-level naval planning. 
• Chapter IV - Model Development: Describes the process and methodology 
employed during the development of the simulation to model the operational- 
level naval combat. 
• Chapter V - Model Analysis and Results: An analysis of selected cases 
comprises this section. 
• Chapter VI - Future Work and Conclusion: As research is far from complete, 
this section discusses the possible directions that this research can take. 
II. AGENT-BASED MODELING 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
Computers are not good at deciding what to do next in the midst of an undefined 
problem and uncertainty. In traditional programs, every situation that a computer may 
encounter must be explicitly anticipated and coded by a programmer. In most cases, 
people happily accept computers as obedient, literal and unimaginative servants. 
However, for an increasingly number of applications, we need systems that can decide 
what to do on their own in order to satisfy their design objectives. Such systems can be 
built with the help of agents. (Weiss, 1999) These agents are the core entities of agent- 
based models. They populate and interact with each other and the environment in these 
models. (Axelrod, 1997) Agents are adaptive software devices. When combined in 
moderate to large numbers, these agents can produce decisions and behaviors that are 
rational, even in ill-defined or dynamically changing complex situations. These rational 
decisions and behaviors advance the agent toward the achieving of its goals or intentions. 
The study of complex systems that have many actors and their interactions often 
becomes too complex for a mathematical model. Agent-based modeling is a tool to study 
this kind of system. The tricky part of this modeling tool is to specify the environment, 
agent-knowledge model and the interactions between the agents. (Axelrod, 1997) 
Section B of this Chapter clarifies some of the important terms for agent-based 
modeling and simulation. A number of agent-based applications are introduced in Section 
C. In section D, a short discussion of the similarities and differences between the current 
study  and  other multi-agent  system  (MAS)   simulations  is  presented.  Section  D 
summarizes the important points in the Chapter. 
B.       IMPORTANT TERMS 
1.       Agents 
There is no universally accepted definition of the term "agent." The lack of such a 
definition is primarily because various attributes associated with agency are of differing 
importance for different domains. For some domains, learning is the most important 
aspect of an agent, yet it may be not only unimportant but also undesired for other 
domains. The only concept present in almost all definitions of agents is "autonomy." 
(Weiss, 1999) Agents have autonomy. This means that their actions are the result of 
commands obtained from a user, and the result of a set of goals and tendencies embedded 
in them. (Ferber, 1999) 
An agent can be any type of physical or software entity that fulfills the basic 
concepts of agency. Ferber defines the properties of an agent as follows: 
• An agent is capable of acting and modifying its environment. 
• An agent can communicate with other agents in the environment. 
• An agent has intentions. 
• An agent controls some local resources. 
• An agent is capable of perceiving its environment (but to a limited extent). 
• An agent has only a partial representation of its environment (a reactive agent 
may not have any representation of its environment). 
• An agent possesses skills and can offer services. 
•    An agent may be able to reproduce itself. 
Examples of what an agent can represent include living beings, organizations, 
vehicles, or nations. Agents have the ability to perceive their environment and act upon 
the stimulus from this environment. The actions of agents modify the environment, which 
in turn affects the agent's decision process. These actions are embedded in the agent 
structure generally as weighted-rule sets. The weights of these rules are updated 
continuously according to their performances in the past. The rule with the highest weight 
determines the next movement of an agent. Some ineffective rules can even be replaced 
with new ones. This property allows agents to adapt to their environment more rapidly. 
The ability to adapt to their environment is one of the most important properties 
of agents that distinguish agent-based modeling techniques from other conventional 
modeling techniques. From the agent's point of view, adaptation means changing the 
rules of actions based on what the agent has learned from previous interactions. The 
adaptation capability of an agent allows a simulation to imitate the behaviors of 
increasingly complex systems. 
An agent's internal mechanism for achieving intelligent behavior can range from 
quite simple (in the case of a reactive agent) to exceedingly complex (in the case of a 
cognitive agent). Cognitive agents have some internal representation of the environment 
that they are operating in. The sensory information from outside the agent is processed in 
this representation before taking a new action. Thus, cognitive agents can operate in a 
relatively independent way. By contrast, reactive agents do not have an internal 
representation of the environment. As a result, they take an action according to the 
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information directly sensed from the environment or according to the internal motivations 
that prods them toward accomplishing a task. Since reactive agents are incapable of 
performing complex tasks individually, they are often deployed in large numbers to 
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Figure 1. The Difference Between Cognitive and Reactive Agents 
2.       Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) 
Just like the term agent, finding a widely accepted definition of MAS is difficult. 
Weiss (1999) gives the following characteristics of multi-agent environments: They 
provide a basis for specifying interaction and communication protocols; they are mostly 
open and have no centralized designer; they contain autonomous and distributed agents 
that may be cooperative or self-interested. Instead of defining MAS characteristics, 
Ferber (1999) reports elements that comprise a MAS. These elements are environment, 
objects, agents, relations, operations, and operators. Environment is a space in which 
every object of the MAS resides. Everything in the environment is an object. An agent is 
also an object in the environment that satisfies agency requirements. Relations link 
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objects to each other in the environment. Operations are the actions that agents can 
perform in order to modify the environment and to achieve their goals. Operators can be 
described as the laws of the environment. Operators are basically the reactions of the 
environment to the actions taken by agents. Constructing a MAS requires detailed models 
of these elements. 
Moreover, Ferber defines four type of MAS according to the communication 
ability and physical existence of the agents in the environment. These are: 
• Communicating MAS: A MAS in which agents are situated and have an 
ability to communicate with each other. 
• Purely Communicating MAS: A MAS in which agents are not situated but can 
communicate with each other. 
• Situated MAS: A MAS in which agents are situated and can communicate. 
• Purely Situated MAS: A MAS in which agents are situated but cannot 
communicate with each other. 
Ferber describes three levels of organizations studied in multi-agent systems: 
• Micro-Social Level: Interactions between agents and the various forms of 
links between agents are considered for this level. 
• Group Level: Intermediary structures are considered for this level. 
Population Level: Dynamics of a large number of agents, together with the 
general structure of the system and its evolution are considered for this level. 
3.       MAS Simulations 
Computer simulation imitates selected properties of reality, usually to predict the 
future or to practice and to rehearse problem-solving skills (Thinking Tools, 1999). The 
phrase "imitation of selected properties of reality" implies the model of the system under 
investigation. In most modem simulations, these models are based on either mathematical 
or rule-based relationships between system variables, which can be measured in reality. 
The most frequently used modeling methods are transition matrices, differential 
equations, and rule-based "if-then" systems. These models are either deterministic or 
stochastic depending on the nature of the system under study. 
"Lanchaster Equations," or LEs, introduced by F.W.Lanchaster in 1914, uses a set 
of coupled ordinary differential equations as models of attrition in modern combat. 
Conventional combat models have primarily been based upon these equations even 
though they lacked some of the basic properties of modem combat. Ilachinski (1997) 
identified the following shortcomings of the LEs: 
• LEs did not account for any spatial variation of forces, that is, no link 
established between attrition and movement. 
• Human factors issues were completely discarded in these equations. 
Therefore, Ilachinski concluded that LEs are inadequate for modeling land 
combat and used agent-based simulation techniques for ISAAC (Ilachinski, 1997). 
Ferber (1999) also discussed some of the problems of conventional models. These 
problems are listed below: 
• These models contain a large number of parameters that are challenging to 
estimate. 
• In these models, observing the effects of individuals to the state of the system 
is difficult. 
• These models cannot consider qualitative parameters of the system under 
study. 
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All of the conventional models described above lacked the evolving and adapting 
characteristics of the real systems, particularly because most of these real systems consist 
of elements that adapt or modify their behaviors and internal structure in order to use the 
environment more efficiently. Obviously, models based solely on formulae cannot 
effectively imitate complex, adaptive systems. 
MAS simulation is a new solution to the problem of imitating complex adaptive 
systems. Axelrod (1997) describes MAS simulation as "a way of doing thought 
experiments," the goal of which is to enrich our understanding of fundamental systems. 
He contents that the goal of MAS simulation is not to find solutions to real world 
problems, but rather to provide insight into complex systems that conventional 
approaches cannot model. Therefore, modeling every aspect of the system is unnecessary. 
Axelrod (1997) proposes the famous army slogan, "Keep it simple, stupid" to the MAS 
simulation designers. Otherwise, the change in the outcome of the simulation cannot be 
linked to any particular variant in the simulation and hence makes simulation useless. 
However, one should also be very careful in deciding which aspect of the real world 
should not be included in the simulation. Omitting a key component of a system from the 
simulation may result in meaningless, undesired outcomes. 
C.       NOTABLE MAS SIMULATIONS 
MAS simulations have been used to analyze a broad range of systems. Some of 
these systems are biological systems, organizational systems, and military systems. Even 
some commercial computer games like SimCity are thought to employ MAS simulation 
techniques, although the exact technology for these games has not been published (Hues, 
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1999). The following MAS simulations have been produced by some of the pioneers in 
this domain. 
1. Boids 
Reynolds (1986) designed boids to demonstrate that fully reactive agents acting 
only on local information can generate complex group behaviors. He managed to create a 
flock of birds by equipping them with simple movement rule sets and letting them 
interact with each other in the environment. Boids follow three rules to control their 
actions: 
• Steer to avoid crowding local flockmates (separation rule). 
• Steer toward the average heading of local flockmates (alignment goal). 
• Steer to move toward the average position of local flockmates (cohesion 
rule). 
With this fairly simple rule set, Reynolds demonstrated that his boids exhibit an 
emergent behavior: flocking similar to that of birds without leadership. This study proved 
that using reactive agents with simple rule sets and acting only on local information could 
perform complex tasks. 
2. El Farol Bar Problem 
Brian Arthur introduced the El Farol bar problem to demonstrate the limitations of 
deductive reasoning for solving complex and ill-defined problems and to prove the 
usefulness of agent-based simulation in such cases (Arthur, 1994). The problem is 
actually quite simple. There is a bar named "El Farol" in Santa Fe, New Mexico, that 
offers Irish music on Thursday nights. The bar has limited space, and if less than 60% of 
the patrons are present, the bar is enjoyable. Otherwise, the bar is too crowded to be an 
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enjoyable place. Every Thursday night, each patron has to decide either to go to the bar 
or to stay at home. A patron decides to go if he expects less than 60% of the patrons to 
show up, or stays at home if he expects more than 60% to go. Communication between 
the patrons is not allowed prior to deciding on attending the bar or not, meaning that there 
is no way of knowing how many patrons will be at the bar before one decides to go or to 
stay at home. The choices are unaffected by previous visits and the only information 
available to the patrons is the number of attendance in previous weeks. 
Deductive reasoning fails to solve this problem because there is no obvious model 
that the patrons can use to forecast attendance and to base their decisions on. In his 
solution to the problem, Arthur creates an "alphabet soup" of mathematical predictors 
and randomly ladles out a small number of them to each of the agents. Agents use these 
predictors while deciding to go or not. If the predictor forecasts attendance to be more 
than 60%, the agent stays at home. At the end of each week, the agents update the 
weights of the predictors according to their accuracy for that particular night. This is in 
fact the adaptive property of the agent's behavior in El Farol. The agents are constantly 
looking for better rules to predict the bar attendance so that they can enjoy their night 
either at home or at the bar. Figure 2 shows the outcome of Arthur's solution. Note that 
the number of agents is 100 in this solution. The mean number of attendance always 
converges to 60 as depicted in Figure 2. This is because the predictors are self- 
organizing into equilibrium in which, on average, 40% of the active predictors is 
forecasting an attendance of above 60 and 60% of the active predictors are forecasting an 
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Figure 2. Bar Attendance in the First 100 Weeks (Arthur, 1994) 
predictors. The equilibrium is not changing although the active predictors are changing 
from week to week for each agent. 
3.       Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma 
In 1984, Robert Axelrod used multi-agent simulation techniques to solve the 
problem widely known as Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma. This was the first application 
of genetic algorithms to evolve strategies in interactive environments. (Axelrod, 1984) 
Before discussing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, one should understand the 
basics of genetic algorithms. Genetic algorithms were developed by John Holland, a 
computer scientist at the University of Michigan, to explain the adaptive process of 
natural systems and to design computer systems that retain the important mechanisms of 
natural systems (Goldberg, 1999). They have been used in several applications as search 
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algorithms, where the search space is quite large and complicated. Genetic algorithms are 
composed of three operators: reproduction, crossover, and mutation. For more 
information on genetic algorithms, the reader is directed to (Goldberg, 1999) 
The Prisoner's Dilemma problem is actually very simple. Two people are arrested 
for a crime and put in separate interrogation rooms in a jail. Before the interrogation, they 
are told that they will receive a reduced sentence if they testify against the other. If they 
testify, the other will receive a worse sentence. A prisoner can either cooperate by not 
implicating the other, or defect, by testifying against his accomplice. If this process is 
iterated, the prisoners try to develop a strategy to estimate the next movement of each 
other by evaluating the results of the previous iterations and then act accordingly. Finding 
a strategy in such a case is a complicated problem. This is the place where agent-based 
simulation comes into the play with genetic algorithms to find an effective strategy in a 
huge set of possible strategies. Axelrod used genetic algorithms to solve this problem by 
letting the strategy sets of individuals evolve throughout the iterations. Between 
iterations, effective strategy sets were chosen to create offspring strategies by way of 
reproduction, crossover, and mutation. After about ten or twenty generations, effective 
strategies filled the strategy sets of the individuals, and the individuals did better with 
these strategies. The evolving social environment led to a pattern of increased 
cooperation based upon an evolved ability to discriminate between those who will 
reciprocate cooperation and those who will not. As the reciprocators do well, they spread 
in the population, resulting in more cooperation and greater effectiveness. For more 
information on Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the reader is directed to (Axelrod, 1997). 
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4.       Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC) 
Lanchester Equations (LEs) have been commonly used in military studies as 
models of attrition in modem combat. However, LEs have two serious shortcomings that 
make them inadequate for assessing advanced war fighting concepts. These equations do 
not take spatial components of a combat into account, and they totally disregard human 
factors. (Ilachinski, 1997) 
The goal of the ISAAC was to assess the general applicability of "new sciences" 
to land warfare. Andrew Ilachinski viewed land combat as a dynamic, nonlinear system 
in which many agents interact and try to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. 
Consequently, he used agent-based simulation techniques to develop ISAAC for 
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). 
A blue or red agent in ISAAC is called an ISAACA (ISAAC Agent). ISAACAs 
represent individual infantrymen in the simulation, and they are situated in a battlefield 
consisting of a two-dimensional grid system. See Figure 3 for a depiction of the 
battlefield. 
The overall goal of the ISAACAs is to capture the enemy's flag in the opposite 
comer. An ISAACA can be in one of the three states in a simulation run. These states are 
alive, injured, and dead. The state of an ISAACA effects its capabilities in the battlefield. 
Additionally, ISAACAs are equipped with various range characteristics for their sensors, 
weapons, movements, and communications. 
16 
The personality of each ISAACA consists of six separate movement propensities. 
These propensities drive ISAACA to move toward the following directions: alive 
friendly, alive enemy, injured friendly, injured  enemy, blue flag and red flag. In the 
REDC   11:   188 ISAAC / Version 1.8.4 
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Figure 3. Main ISAAC Screen From Ref.[Ilachinski, 1997] 
battlefield, each ISAACA occupies a grid position. The movement of an ISAACA is 
driven by its personal propensities and sensed environment. A penalty function is used by 
each ISAACA to determine the next movement. This function is calculated for each grid 
that can be reached in the next step, and then the grid with the smallest penalty function is 
visited in the next run. 
D.       CURRENT APPLICATION IN TERMS OF MAS 
The multi-agent system under investigation for the current study is operational- 
level naval combat. This MAS consists of commander agents, conflict zones and 
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platforms. There are two agents in the environment that represents operational-level naval 
commanders. Unlike ISAACAs, these agents are not situated in the environment. Instead 
of being in a geographical space, they are in a problem space like the agents in the El 
Farol Bar and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma simulations. These agents have certain 
personality factors that drive them to their global goal of deterring aggression or 
defeating the opponent. They are cognitive agents, which means that they have internal 
representations of their environment. They keep track of the operational information in 
conflict zones and act according to their internal models of the environment. They 
interact with each other through the interactions of the platforms that they manage. 
Conflict zones and platforms are the objects in the environment. Platforms are situated in 
the conflict zones and managed by commander agents. 
E.       SUMMARY 
This Chapter introduced the basics of multi-agent systems and simulations. The 
inefficiency of the conventional modeling techniques in modeling complex adaptive 
systems has been stated and agent-based modeling and simulation approach proposed for 
such cases. The important terms like agent, MAS and MAS simulation have been 
discussed to construct a basic understanding, although there were no commonly accepted 
definitions for these terms in the literature. A review of significant MAS simulations that 
effectively modeled different systems with different approaches was also included. The 
Chapter concluded with a short discussion of the similarities and differences between the 
current study and presented MAS simulations. The next Chapter presents the key 
concepts in operational-level naval planning. 
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III.   OPERATIONAL-LEVEL NAVAL PLANNING 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
Planning is the act of preparing for future decisions. In this respect, we can think 
of a plan as a practical scheme for solving a problem. A plan helps us to make decision at 
the necessary time and place. Planning is a fundamental part of professional leadership. 
Effective plans link the members and activities of an organization, and help the 
organization react to changing circumstances. 
Military organizations possess complicated structures and deal with diverse types 
of missions, ranging from non-combat missions, from disaster relief to combat missions. 
Planning should be central to all military training and operations. Carefully designed 
plans in peacetime facilitate the decision making during times of crisis, when parameters 
change so rapidly and in ways that are difficult to estimate. Planning leads to faster and 
more accurate decision making, which, in turn, increases the effectiveness of military 
operations. 
Section B of this Chapter clarifies the basics of the military planning process. It 
introduces the principles of the military planning and presents the military planning logic. 
Joint operation and force planning processes for the U.S. Armed Forces are discussed in 
Section C to provide a basic understanding of where naval operation planning fits into the 
whole military-operation planning process.  Section D presents the naval-operation 
planning process in detail. The relevance of the naval operation planning process to the 
current study is discussed in Section E. Section F presents a brief summary of this 
Chapter. 
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B.       BASICS OF MILITARY PLANNING 
1.       Principles of the Military Planning Process 
The main purpose of the military planning process is to facilitate decision-making 
at all levels of the command chain that enables the successful execution of military 
operations. Effective military plans always result from applying sound planning 
principles. These principles form the conceptual framework in which military decision- 
makers evaluate military issues. A brief summary of these principles is given in the 
following paragraphs. Unless otherwise noted, all the information in this section was 
drawn from Ref. (NDP 5, 1996). 
a. Relevance 
Military plans prepared at each level of command must support goals of 
higher authority and must be achievable using available resources. Plans that do not 
support higher-level plans are irrelevant and waste resources or interfere with more 
critical missions. Likewise, unrealistic plans are also irrelevant and misleading for higher 
authorities. 
b. Clarity 
Military plans should be as clear and simple as possible. In this sense, 
common terminology is critical and must be clearly understood at all levels, especially in 
the context of joint operations. A superior plan is useless if the executing units do not 
completely understand it. 
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c. Timeliness 
Plans must be completed and distributed as early as possible in the 
planning process to allow subordinate commanders enough time to prepare their own 
plans. Plans prepared by subordinate commanders under time pressure may not reflect the 
intentions of the superior commander, or they may be impossible to implement. 
Moreover, time pressure hinders coordination between executing units. 
d. Flexibility 
A military plan should clearly state all objectives and avoid unnecessarily 
detailed directions. This allows subordinate commanders to make better use of their 
forces and help them adapt to changing circumstances rapidly. A good plan should state 
what to do and should avoid giving highly detailed directions as much as possible. 
However, the plan should be more detailed at times when the planner suspects that the 
executing units may not know how to implement the plan, or when only one of many 
possible ways to execute the plan will satisfy all of the plan's requirements. 
e. Participation 
Plans must be distributed widely as early as possible to allow the assigned 
commanders to participate and to facilitate their planning efforts. Early awareness of 
responsibilities allows for better integration and coordination of participating units and 
ensures that the plans prepared by subordinate commanders support both plans of the 
superior commander and plans of the other subordinate commanders. 
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/.        Economy of Resources 
Military plans should make sure that the operation will be as economical 
as possible. Unnecessary assignments and movements of the forces should be avoided. 
Limited resources should be controlled at the lowest possible level at which their 
capabilities are best known and can be effectively managed and coordinated for the 
overall benefit of the force. 
g.       Security 
Plans should be kept and distributed carefully to prevent an adversary 
from accessing them and then preparing effective counter-plans. This security can be 
achieved in a variety of ways including: limiting distribution, isolating one's own forces 
with detailed knowledge, and practicing effective communication security. 
h.        Coordination 
In most of the military operations, diverse military units act independently 
to support common objectives of the superior commanders. In such cases, military plans 
should provide sufficient coordination directives to synchronize the efforts of these 
forces. The coordination principle ensures that separate operations and military units 
avoid interference and provide support where and when it is needed. 
2.      Military Planning Logic 
The application of the military planning principles discussed in the previous 
section follows a logical sequence and framework known as "the military planning 
logic." While military problems vary tremendously in character, scope, and time 
available, this logic is common to most military problem solving. Figure 4 depicts the 
22 
flow of military planning logic. According to this logic, the resolution of a military 
problem is divided into four phases. These phases are the commander's estimate of the 
situation, the development of detailed plans, the preparation of the directive, and the 
supervision of the planned mission. All of these phases should follow the military 
planning principles discussed early in the Chapter. These phases will briefly be discussed 











Figure 4. Military Planning Logic (NDP 5,1996) 
a.        Commander's Estimate of the Situation 
In this phase, the decision-maker analyzes the situation, evaluating the 
threat and perceiving the mission. The commander looks at the vulnerabilities of his own 
and the opponent's forces and prepares a Course of Action (COA). 
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b. Development of Detailed Plans 
The selected COA is distributed to the subordinate commanders for the 
preparation of detailed plans. Subordinate commanders who probably know the 
environment, possible threats, and capabilities better than the commander prepare 
detailed plans. Detailed plans include the allocation, deployment, and employment of the 
forces in the operational area. The commander then evaluates and approves these plans. 
c. Preparation and Distribution of Directive 
After deciding the COA and creating a detailed plan for it, the commander 
prepares and distributes a directive to execute the plan. This directive should be as clean 
and simple as possible, and it should allow subordinate commanders to take initiative 
where and when necessary. 
d. Supervision of the Planned Mission 
In this phase, the execution of the plan is supervised and adjusted as 
necessary. Time pressure is higher and the environment is very dynamic throughout this 
phase. The control of forces in the operational area falls under this phase in a military 
planning cycle. 
C.       MILITARY PLANNING 
Military planning includes two broad categories of planning; force planning and 
operation planning. Both are integral and mutually supporting parts of military planning. 
Unless otherwise noted, all the information in this section was drawn from Ref. (AFSC 
Pub 1, 1997). The definitions of the terms mentioned in the following sections are 
provided in Appendix-B. 
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1. Force Planning 
Force planning can be described as a military planning process that aims at 
creating and maintaining military capabilities. Military Departments and Services are the 
primary organizations responsible for smoothly executing this process. The force 
planning process is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the 
Secretary of Defense to the military departments and services. The goal of this process is 
to have the necessary military capabilities to conduct the operations planned through the 
operation planning process. In order to achieve this goal, the military services recruit, 
organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and 
then administer and support these forces. (Joint Pub 5-0, 1995) 
The force planning process is not directly related to this thesis, so, it will not be 
discussed in detail. For more information on this process, the reader is directed to (Joint 
Pub 5-0, 1995) and (AFSC Pub 1,1997). 
2. Joint Operation Planning 
Even though this thesis focuses on the operational-level naval planning, knowing 
at which level of the whole military planning process operational-level naval planning 
occurs is crucial. Therefore, the joint operation planning process for the U.S. military will 
be introduced first, and then the operational-level naval planning will be discussed in 
detail. 
Joint military operations are planned by using two distinct processes: the 
deliberate-planning   process   and   crisis-action   planning   process.   The   following 
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paragraphs will introduce these processes, and clarify the similarities and the differences 
between them. 
a. The Deliberate Planning Process 
The deliberate-planning process is conducted in peacetime to prepare for 
conflicts and crises. This process develops plans that address many potential operations. 
These plans, based on several assumptions, require revisions when used for an actual 
crisis or operation. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) generates and 
maintains the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) which is translated into guidance 
and tasking in the Joint-Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The deliberate-planning cycle 
usually begins with the publication of the JSCP and terminates at the end of the period to 
which the JSCP applies. This planning cycle is accomplished in five phases: initiation, 
concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans. Figure 5 
depicts the flow of the deliberate-planning process. (Joint Pub 5-0, 1995) 
This thesis focuses more on the crisis-action planning process than the 
deliberate-planning process. Therefore, phases of the deliberate-planning process will not 
be discussed here. For detailed information on the deliberate-planning process, the reader 
is directed to (Joint Pub 5-0, 1995) and (AFSC Pub 1, 1997). 
b. Crisis-Action Planning Process 
The deliberate-planning process can take from 18 to 24 months to 
complete. However, at times there may be only a few days to plan a military operation. In 
such situations, the crisis-action planning process provides for a rapid transition from 
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Figure 5. Deliberate Planning Process (NDP 5,1996) 
peace to crisis or war. The deliberate-planning process supports this process by 
anticipating Obviously, every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, as the crisis 
develops and the assumptions are replaced with facts and reality, the planning 
accomplished in deliberate-planning process can facilitate effective decision-making and 
execution planning during time-sensitive periods. Crisis-action procedures are designed 
to plan and to initiate a response within whatever time is allowed by the crisis, regardless 
of whether there has been previous contingency planning for this particular scenario. If 
there has been prior deliberate planning, it is considered and exploited whenever possible. 
A crisis has been defined as "an incident or situation involving a threat to 
the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions, or vital 
interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, political, or 
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military   importance  that   commitment   of  U.S.   military  forces   and   resources   is 
contemplated to achieve national objectives." (Joint Pub 5-0,1995) 
The crisis-action planning process is initiated when an event having 
possible national security implications is recognized. Normally, a unified commander 
reports the event, but any unit can report it. Then the geographic combatant commander 
informs the affected component commander of the estimate of the situation and directs 
him to initiate a detailed analysis. In this case, the affected component commander can be 
thought of as a naval operational commander. The initial evaluation includes the 
determining the opponent's strength and one's own available forces in the theater. 
Intelligence and communication capabilities play a vital role in determining the 
opponent's strength in the operational area. 
Crisis-action planning uses previously developed plans (if available) by 
adapting them to current situations and makes the most effective use of the limited time 
available. Crisis-action planning and execution is accomplished within a flexible 
framework of six phases. These phases are situation development, crisis assessment, 
course of action development, COA selection, execution planning, and execution. Figure 
6 depicts the flow of the cisis-action planning process. The phases of this process will be 















Figure 6. Crisis Action Planning Process (NDP 5,1996) 
(1) Situation Development Phase. By observing the routine world 
situation, intelligent resources detect and report events with potential national security 
implications to the National Command Authorities (NCA). Then the NCA, in 
coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), determines whether a military response 
is required. The combatant commander responsible for the area in which the event 
occurs becomes the supported commander. 
This phase ends when the supported commander submits his 
assessment to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the NCA. If the situation is 
so urgent that normal crisis- action planning procedures cannot be followed, the 
commander's assessment may also include a recommended COA, which may serve as the 
commander's estimate (normally prepared in a subsequent phase). 
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(2) Crisis Assessment Phase. During this phase, the NCA, the 
Chairman, and other members of the JCS analyze the situation to determine the need for 
preparing a military option to deal with the evolving problem. At the end of this phase, 
one of the following decisions is made: 
• to remain in this phase and continue to gather information 
• to return to the pre-crisis posture 
• to progress to the next phase of the crisis-action planning process 
(3) Course of Action Development Phase. With the decision having 
been made by the NCA to develop military options, the CJCS issues a Warning Order 
directing the development of the COA. If time permits, the supported commander will 
then assign component commanders (an operational-level naval commander is one of 
them) the task of identifying the forces and the supplies necessary to support the CO As 
under consideration. At the end of this phase, the supported commander submits his 
recommended COA to the NCA and CJCS, in the form of an estimate of the situation. If 
the nature and timing of the crisis mandate accelerated planning, the CJCS may proceed 
directly to the COA selection or execution phase. 
(4) Course of Action Selection Phase. The CJCS, in coordination 
with the Joint Chiefs, reviews and evaluates the COA provided in the supported 
commander's estimate. They prepare recommendation and advice for the NCA to 
consider. The NCA selects a COA and initiates the execution planning. The CJCS then 
issues an alert order to the supported commander advising him of the COA selected. This 
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is the formal crisis-action planning process method of notifying the supported 
commander of the selected COA and initiating execution planning. 
(5) Execution Planning Phase. This phase is similar in function to 
the plan-development phase of deliberate planning, in that the necessary detailed 
planning is performed. This allows COA to be executed when directed by the NCA. The 
supported commander, with the help of his component commanders, identifies the actual 
forces, sustainment and strategic deployment resources, and describes the concept of 
operations in an operation order format. 
The emphasis during this phase is on the supported commander 
and its component commanders (operational-level naval commander). They review the 
alert order to get the latest guidance on forces, timing, constraints, etc. The planning done 
during the COA development phase is adjusted and updated for any new forces or 
sustainment requirements, and the sourcing of forces. This phase ends with a NCA 
decision to implement the operation order. 
(6) Execution Phase. The NCA decision to choose the military 
option and to execute the operation order opens the execution phase. The Secretary of 
Defense authorizes the CJCS to issue an Execute Order, which directs the supported 
commander to implement the operation order. The supported commander then issues an 
Execute Order to the component commanders to initiate the execution of the operation. 
At this point, changes to the original plan may be necessary due to 
strategical, operational, or tactical considerations. This phase continues until the crisis is 
terminated or the mission is terminated and force re-deployment has been completed. If 
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the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances 
change and the missions are revised. 
D.       NAVAL OPERATION PLANNING 
The previous section described the flow of two different and supplementary joint 
military operation-planning processes. In both of these processes, the supported 
commander is the key personnel since operational plans are prepared and executed under 
his responsibility. During the operation planning and execution phases, the supported 
commander uses his component commanders who are most familiar with the capabilities 
and limitations of their service forces and specific warfare types, like land warfare or 
naval warfare. If the operation needs a joint-force structure, the supported commander 
focuses on integrating and coordinating the operation and execution plans, which the 
component commanders prepare. 
If only one type of service force, like the naval force considered in this study, is 
needed for a particular operation, the specific component commander becomes the key 
personnel in the whole planning process as the operational-level commander. In this case, 
the supported commander generally relies on the assessments and plans generated by the 
operational-level commander and acts as a communication bridge to higher authorities. 
In a crisis-action planning cycle, the naval component commander conducts three basic 
responsibilities. These are preparation of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation, 
preparation of naval operation plans, and coordination of the plan execution. These 
responsibilities are discussed briefly in the following. Unless otherwise noted, all the 
information in this section was drawn from Ref. (NDP 5, 1996). 
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1. Commander's Estimate of the Situation 
The component commander prepares the Estimate of the Situation document, 
which evaluates and summarizes the potential COAs. This document includes a mission 
statement, a description of the situation, an analysis of enemy capabilities, and a 
comparison of the potential COAs. 
The intelligence capability of the component commander significantly affects his 
estimate, which in turn affects the COA that higher authorities will select. If the 
component commander does not know the force level and disposition of the adversary 
precisely, the COA and the forces allocated to this operation will most likely be 
inadequate. 
2. Preparation of Naval Operation Plans 
Naval operation plans are the basic tools for coordinating the naval actions at the 
operational or tactical level. This phase basically consists of two important sub-phases. 
These are operation planning and force planning. The component commander develops 
these plans according to the estimate of the situation that was prepared in the previous 
phase. Therefore, this estimate greatly influences the outcomes of both of these planning 
processes. Misleading intelligence may cause the component commander to select an 
unsuitable COA. 
Likewise, the experience level of the component commander affects the outcomes 
of these planning processes. A commander that is comfortable with a particular type of 
warfare (anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, etc.), a type of platform (fast patrol boat, 
destroyer, etc.), and a type of tactic (concentration of forces, disposition of forces, etc.) 
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will  most  likely  develop  plans   accordingly,   and  this  will  eventually  affect  the 
composition and disposition of the forces allocated to the operation. 
3.       Coordination of the Plan Execution 
During the execution of the operation plan, the naval component commander is 
responsible for coordinating the naval tactical commanders in the operation area. This 
guarantees the maximum impact from naval force capabilities to achieve the operational 
and strategic objectives. The naval component commander continuously monitors the 
movements of the forces in the operational area. During this phase, changes to the 
original plans will most likely be needed due to tactical considerations (adversary force 
movements, one's own force needs, etc.). At this point, the naval component commander 
makes sure that the tactical commanders have necessary forces where and when they 
need them. 
E.   CURRENT STUDY IN TERMS OF NAVAL PLANNING 
As discussed in the previous section, in times of crisis, the responsibilities of a 
component commander, or operation-level naval commander are to allocate, initially 
deploy, and manage the task force in the operational area to obtain the desired results. 
This thesis explores the outcomes of decisions made by operational commanders who 
have the three basic responsibilities mentioned above. 
Before discussing how the operational commander makes these decisions in this 
particular simulation, one should know the following information about the simulation. 
The blue commander agent in the current simulation represents the operational-level 
naval commander under investigation. The red commander agent is the opponent who 
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creates the crisis situation. The simulation consists of three consecutive multi-agent 
systems that model the force allocation, the initial force deployment, and the force 
management responsibilities of the opponent commanders. In the beginning of the 
simulation, the user determines the properties of the red commander and the initial red 
force level in the operational area. The user also defines the inventory, the available 
budget, and the properties of the blue commander that affects his decisions in the 
simulation. Moreover, the user defines the properties of the platforms that are employed 
by the commanders in the operational area. Some of these properties are combat power, 
speed, endurance, and cost of the platform. 
Allocating platforms from available inventory to the task force is the primary task 
of an operational-level naval commander at the beginning of a crisis.  At this point, the 
most important information the operational commander needs is the opponent's force 
level in the crisis area. In the real world, this information is obtained from varying 
intelligence sources. The accuracy of the intelligence directly depends on the reliability 
of these sources. In this study, the user provides the initial intelligence capability of the 
blue operational commander at the beginning of the simulation. This capability is defined 
as a number between zero and one. An intelligence level of one means that the blue 
commander knows the exact force level and disposition of the red force in the operational 
area. As this level decreases, the difference between the actual opponent force and the 
perceived opponent force increases. Once the blue commander has a limited knowledge 
of the red commander's force level according to his intelligence capability, he initiates 
the platform allocation process. Besides perceived opponent-force level, the personality 
and the warfare usage tendency of the blue commander, the budget allocated for the 
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success of the operation, and the available inventory are the key factors that affect the 
blue commander's force allocation decisions. In the simulation, the blue commander has 
an allocation goal for each platform type that prods him to allocate that particular 
platform type from the inventory to the task force. Within the constraints of the budget, 
the platforms that have the highest goal weights are allocated to the task fprce. These goal 
weights are the functions of the number of red platforms in the operational area, the 
number of blue platforms already allocated to the task force, and the number of available 
platforms in the inventory. 
Once the blue commander allocates platforms to the task force, he needs to 
employ these platforms in different locations in the operational area. The perceived 
disposition of the opponent force in the operational area, and the strategic importance of 
the theaters of the operational area affect the employment decisions. In the simulation, 
the blue commander has a platform deployment goal for each theater that prods him to 
deploy platforms to that particular theater. The blue commander deploys platforms to the 
theaters that have the highest goal weights. 
After the allocation and the deployment of the blue task force, the red and the blue 
operational commanders are responsible for moving and the coordinating the forces in 
different theaters of the operational area. In order to achieve this task, the commanders 
continuously monitor the theaters and decide which force level is needed in each theater. 
In the simulation, both of the commanders have some goals associated with moving the 
platforms in the operational area. They both manage the maneuvers of their platforms by 
choosing the highest weighted goals. 
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The combat resolution between the opponent forces is conducted in a simple way. 
If both forces are in the same theater and one of them decides to attack the other because 
he thinks that he has the attrition advantage, simple mathematical calculations are used to 
resolve the battle. Obviously, aggressiveness personality attribute of the commanders, 
and the perceived opponent force level are the two factors that greatly affect the 
commanders' attack decisions. 
F.       SUMMARY 
The first part of this Chapter introduced the basics of the military planning, the 
military planning logic, and the principles of the military planning process. The military 
planning process was divided into two broad categories: force planning and operation 
planning. The force planning process was covered briefly since this process is outside the 
scope of this study. The joint operation planning process was also divided into two broad 
categories: the deliberate-planning process and the crisis-action planning process. The 
deliberate-planning process was briefly detailed because this process is also outside the 
scope of this study. The crisis-action planning process was discussed in detail to provide 
a basic understanding of where naval operation planning fits in the whole military 
operation planning process. The naval operation planning process was introduced in 
detail and the Chapter concluded with a short discussion on how and to what extent the 
naval operation planning process is modeled in this study. 
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IV. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The background material presented in the previous Chapters serves as a basis for 
developing a MAS model to explore the operational-level naval combat. This model does 
not completely encompass the operational-level naval combat. It was developed as a 
prototype "proof-of-principle" to initiate work in this area and to establish a "virtual, 
agent-based simulation workspace" for future developments. The following sections 
provide a broad explanation of the algorithms and methods used to build the model 
framework. For a more in-depth comprehension of the model, the reader is encouraged to 
further analyze the model's computer code. 
Section B of this Chapter introduces the simulation environment in which the 
commander agents and the platforms interact with each other. Section C presents the 
characteristics of the blue and the red commander agents and their instantiation by the 
user. The platforms and their instantiation are explained in Section D. In Section E, the 
goal types, goals, rules, and the goal selection mechanisms of the commander agents are 
introduced in detail. The stochastic intelligence gathering process is described in Section 
F, and similarly, the stochastic combat resolution process implemented by the simulation 
is introduced in Section G. The simulation interface is presented in Section H. Section I 
gives a brief summary of the entire Chapter. 
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B.       ENVIRONMENT 
A user accesses the model program by way of a Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
The main environment object for the simulation is the ConflictZone object, which 
represents a zone in the operational area. When a user initiates the program, 15 
ConflictZone objects are automatically initiated from within the SimEnv class as five 
columns and three rows. Three pixels represent one nautical mile in this simulation and a 
ConflictZone object consists of 240 by 240 pixels, meaning that each ConflictZone object 
represents a zone of 80 by 80 nautical miles. The collection of these ConflictZone objects 
constitutes the simulation environment that represents the operational area in which the 
operational-level naval combat occurs. The resulting graphical dimensions of the 
simulation environment are 400 nautical miles (1,200 pixels) left to right (east to west), 
and 240 nautical miles (720 pixels) top to bottom (north to south). See Figure 7 for a 
depiction of the simulation environment and its dimensions. 
The operational area is divided into three theaters. The zones numbered one, six 
and eleven constitute the east theater of the operational area. Likewise, the zones 
numbered three, eight, and thirteen form the center theater, and the zones numbered five, 
ten, and fifteen form the west theater. The zones numbered two, four, seven, nine, twelve, 
and fourteen are also called transition zones. Any platform transiting from one theater to 
another in an east-west or a west-east direction passes through one of these transition 
zones. Additionally, the red commander can replenish his platforms in the zones 
numbered two and four. Similarly, the blue commander can use the zones numbered 
twelve and fourteen for replenishment purposes. 
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Figure 7. Simulation Environment 
Every ConflictZone object maintains the blue and the red platform objects in two 
different vector structures. The blue and the red commander agents access the 
information about their own and their opponent's forces through these vectors. They can 
also manipulate the platforms through the ConflictZone objects. 
Every theater in the simulation has a hard-coded strategic importance value. This 
value is the same for all the zones in that particular theater. The strategic importance 
value is a number between zero and one. As this value increases, the strategic importance 
of the theater and its zones to the commander agents increases. This prods the 
commander agents toward assigning more platforms to these zones. Therefore, a theater 
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that has a higher strategic importance will have more blue and red forces than the theaters 
that have lower strategic importance values. 
The only paint method used throughout the program is located within the SimEnv 
class. The paint method is the common Java method used to draw the visual graphic 
display. The paint method in the SimEnv class calls the draw method within the 
ConflictZone class to display the conflict zones. The draw method in the ConflictZone 
class then calls the draw method within the Vessel class to display the blue and the red 
vessels in those conflict zones. 
C.       AGENTS 
Agents are the objects, which represent the interactive entities operating within 
the artificial environment explained above. Agents have ways of gathering information 
about their environment and intelligently adapt the actions based on their characteristics, 
propensities, and the perceived opponent. The agents chosen to represent the primary 
players of this operational-level naval combat scenario are the blue and the red 
operational-level naval commanders. Note that the platforms that form the blue and the 
red forces are the objects, not the agents in the simulation. The blue and the red 
commander agents, which are not visible in the simulation environment, manipulate these 
platforms. 
Separate Java classes are used to create the two types of agents. There are many 
attributes that must be defined before creating a commander agent. The combination of 
these attributes leads to one of the most insightful capabilities of the simulation. Different 
combinations can often result in many different outcomes and agent performances during 
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a simulation run. The user supplies the agent attributes through Java panels that contain 
sliders for each attribute (see Figures 8 and 9). 
Each agent has certain types of goals that are embedded in it at the beginning of 
the simulation. The types of goals are platform allocation, force deployment, and force 
movement goals for the blue and force movement goal for the red agent. The commander 
agents have different goals for each goal type, and these goals compete with each other to 
be the active goal of their goal type. The details about the goal types, the goals, and the 
dynamic goal selection process will be discussed in Section E of this Chapter. 
1.       Blue Commander Agent Attributes 
The blue commander is the agent under consideration in this study. This agent 
solves force allocation, force deployment, and force movement problems in the 
simulation environment. The user creates the blue commander agent by setting its 
characteristics at the beginning of the simulation. The blue commander's characteristics 
consist of ten different attribute/propensity values. All of these characteristics range from 
one to ten. Once the user supplies these characteristics, except for the budget, they are 
automatically divided by ten and converted to a number between zero and one for the 
calculations in the simulation. The budget value is multiplied by 100 before the 
calculations in the simulation. Figure 8 shows how the sliders bars are arranged on the 
Java panel. 
The first agent characteristic enables the user to set the initial intelligence 
capability of the blue commander. This value represents the accuracy of the intelligence 
received from sources at the beginning of the crisis situation. Some of these sources may 
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be satellites and/or other military/civilian sources. The difference between the actual and 
the perceived red force level decreases with an increasing initial intelligence capability. 
The calculation of the perceived red force by using this characteristic will be explained in 
detail in Section F. 
The speed preference value represents the commander's propensity to allocate 
fast naval platforms like fast patrol boats to the task force. Likewise, the staying power 
preference value indicates the commander's tendency to allocate more resilient platforms 
like a destroyer or a frigate to the task force. 
tt|| Blue Commander Personality / Capability Editor 
Please Enter the Personality/Capability Characteristics of the Blue Commander 
Intelligence Capability 
Speed Preference 
Staying Power Preference' 
Surface Platform Usage Tendency 
Sub-Surface Platform Usage Tendency 
Air Platform Usage Tendency 
Aggressiveness 
Budget (x 100) 
A 2 ':3;4   5   6  7  8   9 10 
:■'■■     < .   i ■ : v   . .).'»■     i ■   :   ,   I  •   i     .I ' 
O   1   2   34  5  6  7   8 SMO 
0 A  2J 3 4 5 ö 7 8 910 
O  1  2   3 4 ;S 6 7 8 910 
O  1  2   3 4  5 «7   8 910 
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0  1   2;3 4  5 6:7  8910 
!    i    i     i    i  "i    r ■  i,    3    r 'i 
0  12   34567  8 910 
O 1   2   3 4  5 6 7  8 910 
OK 
Figure 8. Blue Commander Agent Instantiation Slider Panel 
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The surface platform usage tendency, sub-surface platform usage tendency, and 
air platform usage tendency values represents the commander's propensity to employ 
that particular type of warfare in the crisis area. For instance, the number of surface 
platforms will more likely be greater than the other kinds of platforms (air and sub- 
surface platforms) when surface platform usage tendency is higher than the others. 
Moreover, the speed and the staying power preference values distinguish the fast patrol 
boats from the frigate and destroyer in the platform allocation process. However, these 
are not the only criteria when deciding to allocate a platform from the inventory to the 
task force. The opponent's force combination and obviously, the budget available to the 
blue commander affect his force allocation decisions. 
The aggressiveness personality factor represents the blue commander's 
aggressiveness level. The higher this value is, the more likely the blue agent will employ 
his forces in the front lines of the theaters and decide to continue to fight even in cases of 
a force ratio disadvantage. 
The budget value of the blue commander represents constraints in the platform 
allocation process. Each operation has to be succeeded within certain economic limits. 
Obviously, deploying all of the available platforms in the inventory to the task force is 
neither an economical nor a feasible solution. Some of the platforms should be kept in 
hand to conduct other important missions and to be able to respond to any other crisis that 
may arise in a different region. Every platform in the simulation has a cost value and 
allocating a platform from the inventory to the task force decreases the blue commander's 
budget by the platform's cost. 
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2.       Red Commander Agent Attributes 
The red commander agent represents the commander who creates the crisis 
situation. This agent solves only the force movement problem in the simulation 
environment. The user determines the initial red force structure and its initial disposition 
in the operational area at the beginning of the simulation. Therefore, the red commander 
agent does not need to solve the force allocation and force deployment problems. The 
user creates the red commander agent by setting its characteristics at the beginning of the 
simulation. The red commander characteristics consist of two different personal 
propensity values. Figure 8 shows how the sliders bars are arranged on the Java panel. 
i Red Commander Personality / Capability Editor 
Please Enter the Personality Characteristics of the Red Commander 
m Aggressiveness ;      f       . .   , 
012345678 910 
Force Concentration Tendency 
012345678910 
OK 
Figure 9. Red Commander Agent Instantiation Slider Panel 
The aggressiveness value for the red commander functions the same way as it 
does in the blue commander agent properties. The force concentration tendency value is 
used to control the initial disposition of the red task force in the operational area. If this 
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value is greater than nine (which means that the red commander favors concentrating his 
forces in a theater), the red commander deploys all of his platforms to a theater that has 
the highest strategic importance value. An aggressiveness value between four and nine 
causes the red agent to deploy his platforms to the two theaters that have the highest 
strategic importance values. The proportion of the strategic importance of these zones 
affects the number of platforms deployed to these theaters. Finally, an aggressiveness 
value less than four forces the red commander to deploy his platforms to all of the three 
theaters of the operational area according to the proportion of the strategic importance 
values of these theaters. 
D.       PLATFORMS 
The platforms are the objects that represent the surface, sub-surface,, and air 
vehicles in the simulation. The blue and the red commander agents manipulate these 
platforms. Seven types of platforms exist in the environment. These platforms are 
destroyer, frigate, fast patrol boat, fast patrol boat with helicopter, submarine, fighter, 
and anti-submarine warfare (asw) aircraft. The user supplies the number and the 
combination of the platforms in the red task force and in the blue inventory to the model 
at the beginning of the simulation. The GUI for supplying the number and the 
combination of the platforms in the red task force to the model is shown in Figure 10. 
Likewise, Figure 11 depicts the GUI used to determine the number and the combination 
of the platforms in the blue commander's inventory. 
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Figure 10. Red Task Force Creation Panel 
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Figure 11. Blue Inventory Creation Panel 
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Every platform has thirteen different properties and the user supplies these 
properties to the system before the simulation runs. Clicking on one of the edit buttons on 
the panels shown in Figure 10 or Figure 11 brings up another panel to supply the vessel 
properties to the system. The panel for supplying the blue frigate properties to the system 
is depicted in Figure 12. 
Blue Vessel Property Editor Bx| 
^ -L                                                      Destroyer Properties 
Antr-air Warfare Strength                     r. 8.0|                   j      ' 
Anti-surface Warfare Strength ' ; 8.0                    j. 
Anti-submarine Warfare Strength 8.0                     |    '.: \i 
Atr Defense Strength 8.0                    j 
Surface Defense Strength     : 8.0                h;iv'-':- 
Sub-surface Defense Strength 8.0                !•;•■':"'':. 
Cost{«»terms of million dollars) 600.0               \':'^''\: 
Endurance (in terms of 15 minutes) 240.0               | , 
Supply Time (in terms of 15 minutes) 2.0                    |. / 
Maximum SpeetJ (in terms of knots) 25.0                 | 
Detection Probability Within 80 Miles 
Detection Probability Between SO and 160 Miles 
0.9                             |       .■: 
I  ■  : ' 
Detection Probability Out Of 160 Miles 0.5                     !' 
'.■■:;;■;'                       ::^;'":;T:" :: OK;V'v' 
Figure 12. Blue Frigate Property Editor 
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Only three naval warfare types are considered in this study. These are air 
warfare, surface warfare and sub-surface warfare. The warfare capabilities of a platform 
are broken into two main categories in the simulation. These are offensive and defensive 
capabilities for each type of warfare. The anti-air warfare strength value represents the 
attacking capability of a platform against air platforms. Likewise, the anti-surface 
warfare strength value represents the attacking capability of a platform against surface 
platforms and the anti-submarine warfare strength value represents the attacking 
capability of a platform against sub-surface platforms. 
Similarly, air defense strength, surface defense strength, and sub-surface defense 
strength values represent the defense capabilities of a platform against air, surface, and 
sub-surface platforms respectively. 
The cost value represents the cost of a platform. This value should be supplied to 
the system in multiples of $1 million dollars. Therefore, if the cost of a fast patrol boat is 
$50 million dollars, then its cost value should be supplied to the system as 50. 
The endurance value represents the time unit that a platform can stay at sea 
without fueling. This value is used in the simulation when deciding whether a particular 
platform needs to be re-supplied before further operating in the operational area. This 
value should be supplied to the system in multiples of fifteen minutes, and should be an 
integer value. Therefore, if the endurance of a fighter is two hours, then its endurance 
value should be supplied to the system as eight. 
The supply time value represents the time needed for a platform to conduct 
replenishment. Once a platform arrives in one of the supply zones, it is maintained in that 
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zone until its supply time expires. At the end of the supply, the platform resumes its 
initial endurance value. 
The maximum speed value is used when calculating the transition times between 
zones of the operational area. It is assumed that the platforms are always using their 
maximum speed when transiting from one zone to another. 
Finally, the last three detection probabilities represent the platforms' detection 
capability within its zone, in the neighbor zones, and in the zones, which are two zones 
away from its current zone. These probabilities are used in the stochastic intelligence 
calculations during the simulation. The stochastic intelligence calculations will be 
discussed in detail in Section F. 
During the simulation, each platform is presented with a unique shape in the 
environment. These shapes are; 
• Destroyer: filled rectangle (12 by 12 pixels) 
• Frigate: empty rectangle (12 by 12 pixels) 
• Submarine: filled oval (9 by 9 pixels) 
• Fast Patrol Boat: empty rectangle (7 by 7 pixels) 
• Fast Patrol Boat With Helicopter: filled rectangle (7 by 7 pixels) 
• Fighter: empty oval (2 by 2 pixels) 
• ASW Plane: empty oval (4 by 4 pixels) 
The platforms on the blue commander side are blue and the platforms on the red 
commander side are red in color. In order to distinguish the supplying and the transiting 
platforms in the transition zones, the supplying red platforms are presented in green and 
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the supplying blue platforms are presented in gray. Their colors change to their original 
(either blue or red) once they finish supplying. 
E.       AGENT GOAL SELECTION MECHANISM 
As mentioned earlier in the Chapter, the blue and the red commander agents 
perform three different actions in the simulation. These actions are force allocation, force 
deployment, and force movement actions for the blue and force movement action for the 
red commander agent. Each type of action has a goal type associated with it. Therefore, 
the blue agent has three and the red agent has only one type of goal in the simulation. 
Each goal type has numerous goals associated with it and this allows competing and 
conflicting goals to exist within the agents. It also provides a straightforward example of 
dynamic goal selection. 
One rule is provided for each goal in the simulation. Additional rules can be 
included similar to the El Farol simulation discussed in Chapter II. The goal types, the 
goals within these goal types, and the rules associated with these goals will be discussed 
in detail as follows: 
1.       Goal Feedback Mechanism 
All of the goals associated with the three different goal types have a feedback 
mechanism device that allows them to develop a current weight based on the agents' 
personalities and the perceived changing environment. All goals within a goal type use a 
standard formula for determining this weight, which incorporates the following terms. 
•   Gal Attainment (gai): The measurement of how close a commander agent's 
current situation is to fulfilling the ith goal (gi). 
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• Goal Personality Factor (gpfi): The personality trait that influences the ith goal 
(8)- 
• Agent Goal Weight (Agwi): The weight of the ith goal that affects the agent's 
next action. The agent goal weight is determined from the agent's current goal 
attainment value and the agent's personality factor (i.e. how much the agent 
cares about that particular goal being satisfied.): 
Agwi = Agai * Agpfi 
Equation 1. Agent Goal Weight Calculation 
2. Rule Credit Assignment 
Since there is only one rule per goal, a rule credit assignment is not used in this 
simulation. After finding the active goal for a goal type (the goal that has the highest 
weight), the rule associated with this goal is executed. 
3. Platform Allocation Goal Type 
Only the blue commander has this goal type since the red commander does not 
perform the platform allocation action in the simulation. There are seven different goals 
of this type embedded in the blue commander. Each goal represents the need of the blue 
commander to possess one of the seven platforms in the task force. The allocation goal 
weight calculation formula for the destroyer platform type is shown in Equation 2. The 
platform allocation process ends when the blue commander agent's budget level is 
exceeded or there is no platform left in the blue inventory. A complete list of platform 
allocation goals is given in Appendix C. 
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add                  add 
Goal Attainment = 1 - (—^— *    Pnd    ) 
ldd                  Pred 
Goal Weight = GoalAttainment * psur * p 
add '■ The number of destroyers assigned to the blue task force from the inventory 
hd ■ The number of destroyers in the initial blue inventory 
Pred :The perceived number of destroyers in the red task force 
Psur : The surface platform selection tendency of the blue commander 
Pstp : The staying power tendency of the blue commander 
Equation 2. Destroyer Allocation Goal Weight Calculation 
Each platform allocation goal has only one rule associated with it. These rules 
allocate one of the seven types of platforms from the inventory to the blue task force. 
These rules can also be viewed in Appendix C. 
4.      Force Deployment Goal Type 
Similar to the platform allocation goal type, only the blue commander has a force 
deployment goal type since the user determines the deployment of the red forces. There 
are three different goals of this type embedded in the blue commander agent. Each goal 
represents the need of the blue commander to deploy a platform to one of the three 
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theaters of the operational area. The blue platforms can initially be deployed to the zones 
numbered eleven, thirteen, and fifteen. Likewise, the red platforms can be deployed to 
zones numbered one, three, and five. The deployment goal weight calculation formula for 
the blue commander agent for the zone 11 is depicted in Equation 3. This calculation is 
performed for each type of platform separately until all of the platforms allocated to the 
task force in the previous step are deployed to any of the three zones. A complete list of 
the force deployment goals is given in Appendix D. 
Goal Attainment = 1 - ( ^—) 
Ppredl 
Goal Weight = GoalAttainment * zimp 
b n : The number of blue platforms of a type deployed to zone 11 
p rera: The perceived number of red platforms of a type in zone 1 (same theater) 
zim   : The strategic importance value of the theater that spans the zones 1 and 11 
Equation 3. Blue Platform Deployment Goal Weight Calculation To Zone 11 
Each force deployment goal has only one rule associated with it. These rules 
deploy one of the seven types of platforms to one of the three zones described above. 
These rules can also be viewed in Appendix D. 
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5.       Force Movement Goal Type 
Both of the agents have force movement goal type since they both control the 
movements of their platforms during the simulation. This goal type was further divided 
into sub-goal types since there is more than one movement possibility for a platform in a 
zone. A platform in a zone can continue to stay in the same zone or can transit to one of 
the two or three neighboring zones. Therefore, the agent commanders have a movement 
goal type for each of the zones in the environment. These movement goal types have 
either three or four associated goals depending on the number of possible movements 
from that zone. The movement goal weight calculation formula for the blue agent from 
zone 10 to zone 15 is shown in Equation 4. A complete list of force movement goals is 
given in Appendix E. 
Goal Attainment = 1 - (-^- *    W   ) 
I  |       P        i _      tsng 
r r 
P" P'sng 
Goal Weight = GoalAttainment * zimp * (1 - agg) 
b l5   : The blue total strength in the west theater 
p pts : The perceived red total strength in the west theater 
btsng : The blue total strength in the neighbor theater (center theater) 
rptsns : The perceived total red strength in the neighboring theater (center theater) 
agg  :  The aggressiveness personality factor of the blue commander 
zimp :  The strategic importance value of the west theater 
Equation 4. Blue Agent Move Goal Weight Calculation From Zone 10 to Zone 15 
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Each force movement goal has only one rule associated with it. These rules either 
keep a platform in a zone for the time step or transfer it to another zone depending on the 
weight of the movement goals associated with that particular zone. These rules can also 
be viewed in Appendix E. 
F.       STOCHASTIC INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
The intelligence gathering process about the opponent's force level and 
disposition is implemented stochastically in two different parts of the simulation. The 
stochastical calculations described below are based on the formulas in Ref. (Gaver, 
Jacobs, Youngren, Parry, 2000). 
The first stochastical intelligence gathering process is conducted at the beginning 
of the simulation. Once the user determines the red force structure and disposition, the 
blue commander perceives the opponent force level using a stochastical perception 
process. For each platform type in the red force, a series of binomial trials are conducted 
with the probability of success being the initial intelligence capability of the blue 
commander and the number of trials being the actual number of red platforms of that 
type. The formulas for this process are provided in Equation 5. This stochastical feature 
of this perception process allows different perceptions at different times with the same 
red commander force level. 
The second stochastical intelligence gathering process is conducted during the 
actual simulation runs. Since the number of the red and the blue platforms in any zone 
changes dynamically during the simulation, it is not realistic to set a probability of 
detection value for every zone for both the blue and the red commanders. As mentioned 
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Xt~ Binomial with the number of trials being the actual 
number of opponent platforms in the red task force and the 
probability of success (p() being the initial intelligence 
capability of the blue commander. 
The moment estimator   (r^  for the actual number of red 
platforms in the red task force is: 
Pi 
Note that 
TV E[r. ] = -!£- =r. 
So, rt is an unbiased estimator for the actual number of red platforms in 
the red task force. 
Equation 5. Initial Stochastical Intelligence Gathering Calculations 
earlier in this Chapter, every platform has a user defined detection probabilities 
depending on the target range. For each zone, the blue and the red commanders determine 
the two platforms that have the highest detection probabilities for that zone. These two 
platforms calculate their opponent's force level estimates for that zone based on their 
probability of detection values. This calculation is conducted the same way it was 
explained above for the blue commander's initial estimation of the red force level. Once 
the commander agents get these estimates from the two platforms, they combine these 
estimates based on their variance values. The first step in this process is to calculate the 
estimated variances for the estimates. The following formula is used for this calculation. 
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Var{ri]= Vi   =—rVflr[A,J   - 5  
Pi" Pi' Pi 
Equation 6. Variance Calculation For the Platform Estimates 
Once these variances are known, the Equation 7 is used to obtain a combined weighted 
estimate from the two estimates. Note that this formula takes the weighted average with 




<-V,2 r = -
L
- - 1 1 
1 2 
vi V2 
Equation 7. Combining Platform Estimates 
G.       STOCHASTIC COMBAT RESOLUTION 
The combat resolution part of the simulation is also implemented stochastically. 
Once the simulation begins, the commander agents continuously maneuver their 
platforms between the zones to have force superiority in the zones. The decision to fight 
in a particular zone is made by the commander agents in each time step based on their 
aggressiveness personality factor and the perceived force ratio for that particular zone. 
Increasing aggressiveness and/or perceived force ratio prods the commander agents to 
decide to fight in a particular zone. The combat can occur in any of the zones numbered 
six, eight, or ten. Once one or both of the commander agents decides to fight in a time 
step, it is assumed that the combat occurs during that time step in every combat zone. 
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As described previously in the Chapter, every platform has three different types 
of warfare capabilities (air, surface, and sub-surface). Each warfare capability is further 
divided into offensive and defensive capabilities. This results in six factors to be 
considered during the combat resolution part of the simulation. It is assumed that every 
type of offensive and defensive capabilities are allocated to other platform's offensive 
and defensive capabilities. For instance, a platform that has an air defense capability of 
ten units can allocate four units of this capability to protect its air assets, while assigning 
four units to protect its surface and two units to defend its sub-surface assets. Likewise, a 
platform that has an air offense capability of ten units can allocate four units of this 
capability to attack the opponent's air assets, while allocating four units to attack its 
surface assets and two units to attack its sub-surface assets. This allocation idea makes 
the combat resolution calculations more realistic. Obviously, an air attack does not 
generally degrade the sub-surface warfare capabilities of a platform as it degrades its air 
and surface warfare capabilities. 
Once the warfare capabilities are partitioned to the opponent's warfare 
capabilities, the second step is to calculate force ratios for each type of warfare 
combination. These combinations are air, surface, and sub-surface attacks to degrade the 
opponent's air, surface, and sub-surface assets. This approach results in nine equations 
for each commander agent. The formulas used to calculate the resulting surface defense 
and offense capabilities of the blue task force in a zone after the red task force attack is 
given in Equation 5. The same calculations are conducted to get the resulting air and sub- 
surface offense/defense capabilities of the blue force. Likewise, all of these calculations 
are also carried out to get the resulting force level of the red force. 
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Kr,ur (Ä. t) = 0.4 * Asur (R, t) Dsur_sur (B, t) = 0.4 * Dsur (B, t) 
sur,sur y 
r„(»r,*r)- 
« sur.sur ' 
The X"Ä ß (5«r, 5«r) value can be considered as the surface capability losses in 
the blue force after the red force surface attack. The KRB{air,sur) and 
KR B (sub, sur) values can be calculated the same way. Once these values are known, 
the following formula is used to calculate the resulting surface offense and defense 
capabilities of the blue commander. 
Asur (B,t + l) = Asur (B, t) * (1 - KRB (sur, sur)) *(l- KR_B (air, sur)) * (1 - KRB (sub, sur)] 
D    (B, t +1) = Dsur (B,t)*(l- fCRB (sur, sur)) * (1 - KRB (air, sur)) * (1 - KRB (sub, sur) 
Once the final offense and defense surface capabilities of the blue force is 
calculated, the resulting capabilities are allocated to the platforms in the combat zone 
based on their surface, air, and sub-surface defense capabilities. A platform that has 
high defense capabilities (i.e. destroyer) gets less degradation than a platform that has 
less defense capabilities (i.e. fast patrol boat). 
Equation 8. Combat Resolution Calculation 
H.       RUNNING THE SIMULATION 
The simulation program can be started by typing "Java TestSimEnv" in the dos 
prompt window. When the program is started, the initial GUI element appears on the 
screen is displayed in Figure 13. Pressing the "Start" button on this window brings up 
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Figure 13. Initial Simulation Environment 
the window displayed in Figure 10. The user is requested to create the red task force by 
typing the number of platforms of each type to the corresponding text fields. Typing the 
"edit" button across a platform type brings up the GUI window displayed in Figure 12. 
From this GUI window the user can supply the characteristics of the platform to the 
simulation. Clicking the "OK" button closes this window and makes the previous 
window active (window displayed in Figure 10). Once the user is done with typing the 
number of platforms in the red task force, clicking the "OK" button of the GUI window 
displayed in Figure 10 closes this window and brings up the window in Figure 11. The 
usage of this GUI window is nearly identical to GUI in Figure 10. The only difference is 
that this GUI is used to create the blue commander agent inventory. Once the user is done 
with this window, clicking the "OK" button brings up the window displayed in Figure 8. 
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This window is used to supply the characteristics of the blue commander to the 
simulation. Pressing the "OK" button in this window opens the window in Figure 9 and 
the characteristics of the red commander agent is supplied to the system through this GUI 
element. Clicking on the "OK" button in this window brings up one last window before 
the movement part of the simulation is ready to run. This window is displayed in Figure 
14. The simulation parameters are supplied to the model by using this GUI element. Once 
these values are supplied, clicking the "OK" button in this window brings up the 
simulation environment (displayed in Figure 7) filled with red and blue platforms. 
1 PIS Simulation Parameters ED 
i^^^ 
C 1 hour 
Number of Simulation Ruins 200 
Sim event-step interrupt (in sees) 3 
Step Time  C 15 minutes     i 45 minutes • I3Ö miriütesf    C 
OK 
Figure 14. Simulation Parameters GUI Window 
Once the red and the blue platforms are displayed on the screen, the next step is to 
start the movement / engagement part of the simulation by pressing the "Go" button in 
the window shown in Figure 13. The simulation can be paused at any time by pressing 
the "Pause" button on the environment window. The user can also access the information 
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about a conflict zone by clicking on that zone during the simulation. Clicking a zone 
brings up the window in Figure 15. This window reports the number of the blue and red 
platforms in the zone, the active movement goals of the blue and the red commander for 
the zone and the strategic importance value of the conflict zone. 
[HIConflict Zone Report ■ 
;; Blue Force Blue In Supply Fled Force Red In Supply 
Destroyers :Md:!r 'i;:::::o': .'■'. ' Ay 'ApAyA: :''P.^::W:K'':- 
Frigates ■io^'pil ■^A^vAAAA. pya:-j\A 'A'Q' :'-' 
Fast Patrol Boats (Helo Onboard) :.:vA-- '-A 'A;A,^A':A':A; 0 PP'^., 'A:r: 
Fast Patrol Boats HAP A. 0 yÄ'A ■':■'■''■: v.:;-1;:::0:"'',' 
Submarines ■■■•- ■!i':AA. ': 0.- ■:■     '; ■iA^--'A '';-.':Avtr:A[: 
Fighters 0 "AA-MA^-   'y:,: ■■■A<&AA} 'A:^i&:';Ay :;-■]': 
ASW Planes 0      ; yA::^yyAAA^ A-/Q:: AA- A;AQ::'\A} 
Blue Commander Active Goal BlueStayinZoneSGoal 
Red Commander Active Goal RedMoveFromZone6ToZone1Goal 
Conflict Zone Importance   " 
'V$P'P 
Zone X Position ■^,'^A 
Zone Y Position "'24p::'/::: 
Zone Number :';)6 ;.;■■;■;'.: 
/•'§§ 
Figure 15. Conflict Zone Report Window 
The simulation terminates when the program step counter reaches the number of 
simulation runs supplied by the user or the force ratio in the operational area drops below 
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the level of 1/3 for either of the task forces. The user can also terminate the program by 
selecting the "Exit" menu item under the "File" menu option in the window displayed in 
Figure 13. 
I.       SUMMARY 
The first part of this Chapter introduced the environment that represents the naval 
operational area in which the simulation takes place. The dimensions of the environment 
and detailed information about the conflict zones were provided. The characteristics of 
the commander agents and the platforms, and their instantiation processes were also 
presented in detail. It was pointed out that the platforms are the objects, not the agents in 
the simulation environment. It was also stated that the platforms, not the commander 
agents, are visible in the simulation environment. 
After introducing the environment and the basic entities of the simulation, the 
goal selection mechanism of the commander agents for each goal type was introduced in 
detail and the formulas used for the goal weight calculations were provided for each goal 
type. 
The stochastic intelligence gathering and combat resolution processes were also 
presented in detail in two different sections. The basic idea and the formulas associated 
with these calculations were also provided to the user. The final section described the 
interface of the simulation. 
The next chapter proves the usefulness of the model through the output and 
analyses of summary statistics gathered from experimental simulation scenarios. 
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V. MODEL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the usefulness and potential of the model 
by using it to analyze the effects of various blue commander agent characteristics against 
a generically created red agent enemy. Obviously, it is impossible for this thesis to 
demonstrate all of the capabilities and characteristic combinations that this model 
possesses. 
This chapter introduces three experiments. The first experiment is conducted to 
demonstrate that the force allocation decisions made by the blue commander agent at the 
beginning of the simulation are plausible. Likewise, the purpose of the second experiment 
is to show that the initial force deployment decisions made by the blue commander agent 
are also plausible. Finally, the last experiment aims at demonstrating that the overall 
model is producing plausible output that can further be used to explore the effects of 
different initial conditions to the outcome of the overall operation. 
B. METHOD 
This section introduces the area of investigation, the agent and the platform 
characteristics, and the experiments used throughout this Chapter's analysis. 
1.      Areas of Investigation 
In order for any type of model to produce useful results, its sub-models should 
perform their tasks accurately. Therefore, the first two experiments introduced in this 
chapter are conducted to demonstrate that the two MAS sub-models (force allocation and 
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force deployment) of the simulation are generating reasonable results based on the 
different initial conditions. After demonstrating that the two sub-models are producing 
plausible results, the last experiment investigates the affects of different blue agent / force 
characteristics on the result of the conflict resolution. 
2.      Platforms and Their Attributes 
The types of platforms within this model do not encompass all of the different 
types of vehicles found in the navies of the world. However, they are the major types that 
are maintained by most of the navies. Moreover, the user can introduce any type of 
platform to the simulation by simply supplying its characteristics through the 
corresponding GUI elements. 
During the experiments, even though it is possible to assign different attribute 
values to the same type of platforms on the opposite sides, these values are kept the same. 
Note that, the model does not let the user supply different attribute values to the same 
type of platforms within the same task force. 
To the author's and his advisors' knowledge, no study has yet been conducted to 
assign numerical values to the attributes of the naval combat platforms. Therefore, the 
numerical values assigned to the attributes of the platforms in the experiments are based 
on the experience of the author who has served six years in the Turkish Navy. 
Nevertheless, the user can change these numerical values at the beginning of the 
simulation. Table 1 depicts the platform attribute values used in the simulation. 
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Red and Blue Platform Attributes 
Attribute DD FF ';.-.'ssg: FPB FPB 
(Helo) 




9 8 0 6 6 9 6 
Anti-Surface 
Warfare 
9 8 7 6 7 6 5 
Anti-Sub. 
Warfare 
9 7 9 5 6 0 9 
AirDefense 9 8 0 7 7 9 6 
Surface 
Defense 
9 8 9 7 7 9 7 
Sub-Surface 
Defense 
8 7 9 6 6 0 0 
■.Cost- -;■■. 
<Million$) 
600 400 1000 100 150 40 60 
Endurance 
(Hours) 
240 240 240 144 144 4 12 
Supply Time 
(Minutes) 
120 120 120 60 60 30 30 
Max. Speed 
(Knots) 
25 25 25 40 40 900 150 
Pr.of Detect 
(0-80 miles) 
0.9 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Pr.of Detect 
(80 -160 miles) 
0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Pr.of Detect 
(16CM-miles) 
0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Table 1. Platform Attributes for the Experiments 
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3.      Red Commander Agent Characteristics 
The types and the number of platforms in the red task force are kept constant 
throughout the experiments. This data are shown in Table 2. The aggressiveness 
personality factor of the red agent is set to .6 to introduce a cautious and proactive 
opponent to the blue commander. The red commander agent's force concentration 
tendency personality factor is varied in the second experiment to control the initial 
deployment of the red task force in the operational area. This value is set to .2 in the last 
experiment to force the red commander to initially deploy its platform to the all three 
theaters of the operational area. 
Red Task Force 
DD FF '(Mil:; ";v,Fra':,;: FPB (Helo) Fighter ASW Plane 
Number of 
Platforms 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Table 2. Red Task Force for the Experiments 
4.      Blue Commander Agent Characteristics 
The types and the number of platforms in the blue inventory are kept constant 
throughout the experiments. This data are shown in Table 2. The aggressiveness 
personality factor of the blue agent is also set to .6. Its budget value is set to $10 billion 
for the first two experiments and varied in the last one to explore the interaction between 
the budget allocated for the operation and the success of the operation. 
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Blue Agent's Inventory 




Platforms 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Table 3. Blue Agent's Inventory for the Experiments 
5.      Experiment One 
The purpose of the first experiment is to demonstrate that the force allocation 
sub-model of the entire model is producing reasonable results in differing input 
conditions. The attributes of the platforms on both sides are set to the values depicted in 
Table 1. The red task force is composed of the types and number of platforms shown in 
Table 2. Based on the cost of the individual platforms, the total value of the red task force 
is $10 billion. In order to see the blue commander agent's trade-off decisions more 
clearly, its budget attribute is also set to $10 billion. Since the experimenter defines the 
blue commander agent's budget, there are only two factors that can affect its force 
allocation decisions. These factors are the warfare usage tendency and the initial 
intelligence capability of the blue commander agent. 
The blue commander agent's warfare tendency values are varied between the 
trials to simulate four types of commander agents with different warfare usage 
tendencies. These tendencies are surface warfare usage tendency, sub-surface warfare 
usage tendency, air warfare usage tendency and balanced force usage tendency. 
Additionally, two levels of initial intelligence value are used for the blue commander 
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agent. These are high (.9) and low (.2) initial intelligence values. Note that because the 
intelligence gathering process is implemented stochastically in the simulation, the blue 
commander agent's red force level perception changes between the trials that has the 
same input values. All data are captured via out files and then a clustered column graph 
is created for each of the runs. 
6.      Experiment Two 
The purpose of the second experiment is to demonstrate that the force deployment 
sub-model of the entire model is also producing reasonable results in differing input 
conditions. Unless otherwise noted in the following lines, the same input conditions in 
experiment one are used in this experiment. The blue commander's warfare usage 
tendency level is set to a balanced force usage tendency value (the value of .5 is assigned 
to all four warfare usage tendency attributes). 
Once the blue commander agent creates its task force in the force allocation 
process, there are three factors that can affect its force deployment decisions. These are 
the red task force's disposition in the operational area, the blue commander agent's initial 
intelligence capability (which affects the blue commander agent's perception of the red 
force level and disposition in the operational area) and the strategic importance values of 
the theaters of the operational area. In order to avoid a large number of combinations, the 
blue commander's initial intelligence capability and the strategic importance of the 
theaters are set to fixed values. The initial intelligence attribute is set to represent a higher 
intelligence capability (.9) and the strategic importance attribute of the theaters are set to 
the following values; east theater .7, center theater .5 and west theater .9. The only 
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parameter varied between the runs is the red task force's disposition in the operational 
area. This variation is accomplished by changing the red commander agent's force 
concentration tendency. Again, note that, since the intelligence gathering process is 
implemented stochastically in the simulation, the blue commander agent's red force level 
perception changes between the trials that have the same red force and the blue initial 
intelligence values. All data are captured via out files and than a clustered column graph 
is created for each of the runs. 
7.      Experiment Three 
The model can be used to explore numerous operational-level naval combat 
scenarios. Obviously, it is impossible for this thesis to demonstrate all of the capabilities 
that this model possesses. Therefore, a simple scenario is explored in this last experiment. 
The purpose of this experiment is to explore the affects of the blue commander's 
budget level on the naval operation outcome. Specifically, a budget ratio (blue 
commander agent's budget / red commander agent's budget), for which the blue 
commander agent gets consistent victories, is being investigated in this experiment. The 
victory condition is assumed to be having a force ratio of four to one or greater at any 
time in the simulation. When one of the forces exceeds this ratio, that commander agent 
is declared the winner of the particular replication. The simulation is run for five days 
with time step being an hour. If the force ratio does not exceed the victory condition 
during the simulation run, the battle outcome is assumed to be a draw. Unless otherwise 
noted below, the same input conditions in the experiment two are used in this experiment. 
All of the theaters in the operational area have the same strategic importance values. The 
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red commander agent's concentration tendency personality factor is also set to a low 
value (.2) to force it to initially disperse the red task force in the operational area. The 
only variable changing between the trials is the blue commander agent's budget value. 30 
replications are run for each budget ratio and cluster column graph is presented for each 
of budget ratio case. 
C.       RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section discusses the results and method of analyses for the three 
experiments previously discussed. For all of the experiments, a clustered column graph is 
depicted for each combination. 
1.       Experiment One 
The data produced by the first experiment resulted in very plausible values. The 
results of this experiment proved that the force allocation sub-model of the whole model 
is conducting its task effectively. Figures 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 show the number of 
platforms of each type in the actual red task force, the blue commander agent's 
perception of the red task force based on two different initial intelligence level values 
(low and high), and the number of platforms allocated to the blue task force in these 
intelligence level cases. Note that the change in warfare tendency (between figures) and 
the initial intelligence capability (within figures) of the blue commander agent greatly 
and plausibly influence the structure of the allocated blue task force. 
Figure 16 depicts the results of a run in which the blue commander agent's 
surface warfare usage and staying power tendency attributes are set to represent higher 
tendencies (both equal to .9). The other warfare usage and speed tendencies of the blue 
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n Perceived Number in Red Task Force when 
Int.Cap =2 
D Perceived Number in Red Task Force when 
Int.Cap=.9 
D Number Allocated To Bluetask Force when 
Int.Cap =.2 
■ Number Allocated to Blue Task Force when 
Int.Cap =.9 
DD FF FPB        FPB SS       Fighter     ASW 
Heb Plane 
Platform Type 
Figure 16. Force Allocation: Surface Warfare and Staying Power Tendencies High 
commander agent are set to lower values (all equal to .2). Since the surface warfare usage 
tendency attribute of the blue commander agent is much larger than the other two warfare 
usage tendencies, the number of surface platforms allocated to the blue task force is much 
greater than the other types of platforms. Additionally, since the staying power tendency 
of the blue commander agent is much greater than its speed tendency, the number of 
frigates and destroyers allocated to the blue task force surpass the number of fast patrol 
boats. 
Figure 17 depicts the results of a run in which the blue commander agent's 
surface warfare usage and speed tendencies are set to represent higher tendencies (both 
.9). The other warfare usage and staying power tendency attributes are set to lower values 
(all .2). Since the blue commander agent's surface warfare tendency is still much larger 
than the other two warfare usage tendencies, the number of surface platforms allocated to 
the blue task force is again more than the other types of platforms. Additionally and in 
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contrast to the first run, since the blue commander agent's speed tendency is much 
greater than its staying power tendency, the number of fast patrol boats allocated to the 
blue task force is more than the number of frigates and destroyers. 
Figure 18 depicts the results of a run in which the blue commander agent's sub- 
surface warfare usage tendency is set to represent a higher tendency (.9). The other 
warfare usage tendency attributes are set to lower values (all .2). Since the blue 
commander agent's sub-surface warfare tendency is much greater than its other warfare 
tendencies, the number of submarines allocated to the blue task force is more than the 
other types of platforms. 
Force Allocation Sub-Model 
H DH 1 
■ Number in Red Task Force 
DPerceived Number in Red Task Firce when 
IntCap = 0.2 
DPerceived Number in Red Task Force when 
Int.Cap = 0.9 
DNumber in Blue Task Force when In.Cap = 0.2 
B Number in Blue Task Force when Int.Cap = 0.9 
FF        FPB       FPB 
Helo 
SS      Fighter    ASW 
Plane 
Platform Type 
Figure 17. Force Allocation: Surface Warfare and Speed Tendencies High 
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Force Allocation Sub-Model 
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Figure 18. Force Allocation: Sub-surface Warfare Tendency High 
Figure 19 depicts the results of a run in which the blue commander agent's air 
warfare usage tendency personality factor value is set to represent a higher tendency (.9), 
and the other warfare usage tendencies are set to lower values (all .2). Since the blue 
commander agent's air warfare usage tendency is much higher than its other two warfare 
usage tendencies, the number of fighters and ASW planes allocated to the blue task force 
are much higher than the other types of platforms. 
Finally, Figure 20 depicts the results of a run in which the blue commander 
agent's three warfare usage tendencies are equal to each other. In this case, the blue 
commander agent does not prefer any type of warfare to another and its goal is to balance 
the force levels. Since the red task force is a balanced force, the blue task force also 
results in a balanced structure. If there were twice as many air platforms in the red task 
force than the surface platforms, the balanced warfare tendency of the blue commander 
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would allow it to allocate more air platforms to the blue task force even though it does 
not have a high air warfare usage tendency in its personality. 
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Figure 19. Force Allocation: Air Warfare Tendency High 
Force Allocation Sub-Model 
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Figure 20. Force Allocation: Balanced Warfare Tendency 
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2.      Experiment Two 
The data produced by the second experiment also resulted in very plausible 
values. The results showed that the force deployment sub-model of the whole model is 
conducting its task effectively. Figures 21, 22, and 23 displays the number of platforms 
of each type in the actual red task force in a zone, the blue commander's perception of the 
red task force in that zone, and the number of blue platforms deployed to that zone. Note 
that the disposition of the red task force greatly affects the blue commander's deployment 
decisions. 
Figure 21 depicts the results of a run in which all of the platforms in the red task 
force are concentrated in the west theater. We can see that the blue commander agent also 
concentrates its forces in the same theater. Since the blue commander has a balanced 
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Figure 21. Force Deployment: Red Task Force Concentrates in West Theater 
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warfare usage tendency in this run, the number of blue platforms of each type is very 
close to the number of red platforms in the theater. 
Figure 22 depicts the results of a run in which the red task force is deployed to 
two theaters that have the largest strategic importance values. According to the set up of 
the run, these theaters are the east and the west theaters of the operational area. We can 
see in Figure 22 that the blue commander agent also concentrates its forces in the same 
theaters. Since the blue commander agent has a balanced warfare tendency, the number 
of blue platforms of each type is very close to the red platforms counts. 
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Figure 22. Force Deployment: Red Force Splits between East and West Theaters 
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Figure 23 displays the results of a run in which the red task force is deployed to 
all three theaters of the operational area. We can see that the blue commander agent also 
deploys its platforms accordingly, without having a big warfare disadvantage in any of 
the theaters. Again, since the blue commander has a balanced warfare tendency, the 
number of blue platforms in each type is very close to the red platforms numbers. 
Force Deployment Sub-Model 
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Figure 23. Force Deployment: Red Force Deployed to All Three Theaters 
3.      Experiment Three 
The goal of the third experiment is to demonstrate one of the many exploratory 
analyses that can be done by using this model. Unless otherwise noted below, everything 
is the same as it was in the previous experiment. The strategic importance values of the 
theaters of the operational area are all the same. The simulation is run for five days (120 
time step) with each time step representing an hour. Figure 21 depicts the results of 30 
trials for nine different budget ratios. We can see that when the budget ratios (blue 
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agent's budget / red agent's budget) are between .9 and 1.1, none of the sides can win the 
battle. As the budget ratio increases the number of victories for blue agent increases. At 
the budget ratio level of 1.5, the blue task force wins 28 out of 30 trials and finally at the 
budget ratio of 1.6, the blue task force wins all of the 30 trials. 
Note that this experiment does not aim at predicting the budget ratios for which 
the victory is consistent for one side. The whole purpose of this experiment is to show 
that the model can provide insight into many scenarios of the operational-level naval 
planning. 
Interaction between Budget and Victory 
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Figure 25. Interaction between Budget and Victory 
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D.       SUMMARY 
Three different experiments were introduced in this chapter. The first experiment 
was conducted to demonstrate that the force allocation sub-model of the whole model 
was performing its task properly. The results prove that this sub-model works correctly. 
Similar to the first experiment, the purpose of the second experiment was to show that the 
initial force deployment decisions made by the blue commander agent were also 
plausible. The results of this experiment have also proved the usability of this sub-model. 
Finally, the third experiment was conducted to demonstrate one way of doing exploratory 
experiments with the model. Specifically, a budget ratio (blue /red), for which the blue 
agent can get consistent victories, was investigated. The results of this experiment were 
also plausible. The number of blue victories out of 30 trials increased with the increasing 
budget ratio. The budget ratio of 1.5 seemed to be sufficient in order to reach a victory in 
this type of scenario. 
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VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
A.       FUTURE WORK 
This section focuses on some possible future enhancements and modifications to 
the model presented in this thesis. Many of these enhancements would add to the realistic 
representation of the operational-level naval planning process and provide decision- 
makers with better simulation features necessary for force allocation, force deployment 
and force employment evaluations. 
• A command and control hierarchy should be added to the model. In order to 
implement this hierarchy, platform commander agents and tactical 
commander agents and their interactions with each other and the operational 
commander agent need to be introduced. 
• The movement and the detection algorithms should be enhanced. Situating the 
platforms in the simulation environment (assigning location (x, y) coordinates 
rather than zone numbers) would increase the simulation's spatial resolution 
and make the movement algorithm more accurate. Likewise, enhancements to 
the detection algorithm might include introducing probability of recognition, 
correct (or incorrect) classification, and identification parameters to the 
model. 
• More detailed algorithms should be employed in the combat resolution 
calculations. This can be achieved by increasing the simulation's spatial 
resolution and assigning weapon range, probability of hit (P(H)) and 
probability of kill (P(K)) attributes to the platforms. 
• In the current model, a commander agent replenishes a platform when its 
endurance attribute value drops below a critical level. The platform can use 
infinite ammunition during the engagements while it is above this critical 
value. This is a limitation of the model and to overcome 'this limitation, 
ammunition attribute information for different ammunition types should be 
assigned to the platforms. 
• Logistics platforms should be added to the simulation. This would allow 
commander agents to supply their platforms anywhere they want (instead of 
user defined zones) depending on the tactical situation. 
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• More environment attributes should be introduced to the model. Some of these 
attributes might be the sea state and the weather condition (i.e. fog, rain). 
• More platform attributes should be added to the model. Some of these 
attributes might be electronic warfare capability, communications capability, 
and combat readiness factor. 
• The user should be provided with an ability to assign different values to the 
attributes of the same type of platforms in one side. This enables the user to 
define two or more platforms of the same type with different attributes. 
• Mine warfare should be introduced to the model by adding mine warfare 
platforms and defining mine warfare offense and defense capabilities for the 
other platforms in the simulation. 
• Some naval tactics (i.e. concentration, dispersion, and deception) should be 
introduced to the model for exploratory testing purposes. 
• Genetic algorithms should be added to the simulation to provide a method for 
determining optimal force allocation, deployment and employment rules. 
B.       CONCLUSION 
This thesis articulates the modeling of operational-level naval planning process 
through agent based modeling. The model developed for this thesis demonstrates how 
agent-based modeling can capture many dynamic aspects of operational-level naval 
planning process. The model is an outstanding thinking tool for the naval decision- 
makers and is meant to supplement currently available high fidelity models. 
As discussed in the previous section, there are many areas for potential future 
work on this model. The continued modifications and enhancements of the model will 
assist decision-makers in gaining better insight into the operational-level naval planning 
process. This insight will enable them to make more informed decisions in the future. 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
This appendix contains a list of acronyms frequently used in this thesis. 












Course of Action 
Contingency Planning Guidance 
Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat 
ISAAC Agent 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
Lanchester Equations 
Multi-Agent System 
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
National Command Authorities 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
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APPENDIXE. DEFINITIONS 





A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff that provides essential guidance for planning 
and directs the initiation of execution planning following a 
decision by the NCA that U.S. military force may be required 
(Joint Pub 5-0,1995). 
A  commander-in-chief  of one of the   unified  or     specified 
commands established by the President Joint Pub 5-0,1995). 
Commander's 









A document reflecting the logical process of reasoning by which a 
commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military 
situation and decides on a COA to be taken to accomplish the 
mission. 
Developing plans for potential crises or the military requirements 
that can reasonably be expected in an area of responsibility is 
contingency planning. It is conducted during peacetime 
competition, conflict, and war and may be performed deliberately 
or under crisis conditions (Joint Pub 5-0, 1995). 
The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. The COA is 
contained in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation document. 
It includes the concept of operations and an integrated time phased 
database of combat, combat support, and combat service support 
forces and sustainment within the constraints of the time available 
for development. When approved, the COA becomes the basis for 
the development of an operation plan or order (Joint Pub 5-0, 
1995). 
An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its 
territories, citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops 
rapidly and creates a situation of such diplomatic, economic, 
political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military 
forces is contemplated to achieve national objectives (Joint Pub 
5-0,1995). 
The  time-sensitive development of   joint  operation   orders in 




prescribed crisis action procedures and implements an effective 
response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 
contingencies The development of joint operation plans for 
identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted 
principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in 
prescribed cycles that complement other DOD planning cycles and 
is in accordance with formally established joint procedures (Joint 
Pub 5-0,1995). 
The relocation of forces and material to desired areas of operation 









The strategic or tactical use of forces in an area or theater of 
operations. 
An order the competent authority issues to initiate operations. 
A coordinated joint staff procedure commanders use to 
determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to 
direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. 
The Joint Strategic Capabilities plan conveys strategic guidance, 
including apportionment of resources to the CINCs and the Chiefs 
of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on 
military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning 
period. 
The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the 
action to be taken and the reason for taking it. 
National Command    The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized 




A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, 
training or administrative military mission; the process of carrying 
on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and 
maneuvers needed to gain the objective of any battle or campaign 
(Joint Pub 1,1995). 
An order the CJCS issues to initiate execution planning. The order 
normally will follow a Commander's Estimate and will precede the 
Alert Order. NCA approval of a selected COA is not required 
before a Planning Order can be issued. 







task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint 
operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation 
planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares 
operation plans or orders in response to requirements of the CJCS 
(Joint Pub 1,1995). 
A commander who furnishes augmentation forces or other support 
to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. 
A job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by a 
higher authority. 
A command with a broad and continuing mission under a single 
commander and composed of significant assigned components of 
two or more Services, and which is established and so designated 
by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice 
and assistance of the CJCS. 
Warning Order A crisis-action planning directive issued by he CJCS with the 
approval of the NCA, that initiates the development and evaluation 
of COAs by a supported commander and requests that a 
Commander's Estimate be submitted (Joint Pub 1,1995). 
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APPENDIX C. PLATFORM ALLOCATION GOALS AND RULES 
This appendix contains a list of platform allocation goals and rules embedded in 
the blue commander agent. 
Goal - SelectDDGoal 
Rule - AllocateDDToTaskForceRule 
Goal - SelectFFGoal 
Rule - AllocateFFToTaskForceRule 
Goal - Selects SGoal 
Rule - AllocateSSToTaskForceRule 
Goal - SelectFPBGoal 
Rule - AllocateFPBToTaskForceRule 
Goal - SelectFPBHeloGoal 
Rule - AllocateFPBHeloToTaskForceRule 
Goal - SelectFighterGoal 
Rule - AllocateFighterToTaskForceRule 
Goal - SelectASWPlaneGoal 
Rule - AllocateASWPlaneToTaskForceRule 
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APPENDIX D. FORCE DEPLOYMENT GOALS AND RULES 
This appendix contains a list of force deployment goals and rules embedded in the 
blue commander agent. 
Goal - DeployPlatformToZonel IGoal 
Rule - DeployPlatformToZonel lRule 
Goal - DeployPlatformToZonel3Goal 
Rule - DeployPlatformToZonel 1 Rule 
Goal - DeployPlatformToZonel5Goal 
Rule - DeployPlatformToZonel 1 Rule 
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APPENDIX E. FORCE MOVEMENT GOAL TYPES, GOALS, AND 
RULES 
This appendix contains a list of force movement goal types, goals, and rules 
embedded in the blue and the red commander agents. 
Blue Agent Movement Goals: 
Goal Type - BlueZoneöMovementGoal 
Goal - BlueStayInZone6Goal 
Rule - BlueStayInZone6 Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZone6ToZone8Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZone6ToZone8Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZoneöToZonellGoal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZoneöToZonellRule 
Goal Type - BlueZone8MovementGoal 
Goal - BlueStayInZone8Goal 
Rule - BlueStayInZone8 Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZone8ToZone6Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZone8ToZone6Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZone8ToZonelOGoal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZone8ToZonelORule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZone8ToZonel3Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZone8ToZonel3Rule 
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Goal Type - BlueZonelOMovementGoal 
Goal - BlueStaylnZonelOGoal 
Rule - BlueStaylnZonelO Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonelOToZone8Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonelOToZone8Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonelOToZonel5Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonelOToZonel5Rule 
Goal Type - BlueZonel IMovementGoal 
Goal - BlueStaylnZonel IGoal 
Rule - BlueStaylnZonel 1 Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel lToZoneöGoal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel lToZone6Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel lToZonel3Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel lToZonel3Rule 
Goal Type - BlueZonel3MovementGoal 
Goal - BlueStaylnZonel3Goal 
Rule - BlueStaylnZoneB Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel3ToZone8Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel3ToZone8Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel3ToZonel IGoal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel3ToZonel lRule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel3ToZonel5Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel3ToZonel5Rule 
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Goal Type - BlueZonel5MovementGoal 
Goal - BlueStayInZonel5Goal 
Rule - BlueStayInZonel5 Rule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel5ToZonelOGoal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel5ToZonelORule 
Goal - BlueMoveFromZonel5ToZonel3Goal 
Rule - BlueMoveFromZonel5ToZonel3Rule 
Red Agent Movement Goals: 
Goal Type - RedZoneöMovementGoal 
Goal - RedStayInZone6Goal 
Rule - RedStayInZone6 Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone6ToZone8Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone6ToZone8Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZoneöToZonelGoal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZoneöToZonelRule 
Goal Type - RedZone8MovementGoal 
Goal - RedStayInZone8Goal 
Rule - RedStayInZone8 Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone8ToZone6Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone8ToZone6Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone8ToZonelOGoal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone8ToZonelORule 
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Goal - RedMoveFromZone8ToZone3Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone8ToZone3Rule 
Goal Type - RedZonelOMovementGoal 
Goal - RedStaylnZone 1 OGoal 
Rule - RedStaylnZone 10 Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZonel0ToZone8Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZonel0ToZone8Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZonel0ToZone5Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZonel0ToZone5Rule 
Goal Type - RedZonelMovementGoal 
Goal - RedStaylnZone 1 Goal 
Rule - RedStaylnZone 1 Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZonelToZone3Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZonelToZone3Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZonelToZone6Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZonel lToZone6Rule 
Goal Type - RedZone3MovementGoal 
Goal - RedStayInZone3Goal 
Rule - RedStayInZone3Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone3ToZone8Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone3ToZone8Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone3ToZonelGoal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone3ToZonelRule 
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Goal - RedMoveFromZone3ToZone5Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone3ToZone5Rule 
Goal Type - RedZone5MovementGoal 
Goal - RedStayInZone5Goal 
Rule - RedStayInZonel5Rule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone5ToZonelOGoal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone5ToZonelORule 
Goal - RedMoveFromZone5ToZone3Goal 
Rule - RedMoveFromZone5ToZone3Rule 
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